Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy speaks during a meeting at Ramstein Air Base, Germany, on Sept 6, 2024. (Eve Daugherty/U.S. Air Force)
BRUSSELS — As they signaled enduring support for Ukraine last week, European leaders worried about how long they can sustain it.
The White House announced Wednesday that the Group of Seven wealthy countries is committed to giving Ukraine $50 billion in loans, backed by windfall profits from frozen Russian assets. Finalizing the hefty loan before the end of the year has been part of an effort to “Trump proof” aid ahead of the U.S. election. But even as they vow continued funding and weapons for Kyiv, leaders in Europe are apprehensive that a second Donald Trump presidency could fracture alliances.
They are also contending with internal forces that could jeopardize their security commitments to Ukraine. More than two and a half years into Russia’s war, public fatigue risks taking hold in some countries. Some European leaders are now in politically precarious positions and more constrained in what they can do. And across the continent, parties from the hard right to the hard left are pushing narratives against sending cash or arms.
“As long as it takes” remains the European line on support for Ukraine, but many of the continent’s leaders and policymakers acknowledge that the longer it takes, the harder it gets.
Ukraine is facing a tense battlefield situation, preparing for a bleak winter and trying to convince its Western backers of big asks, including an invitation to NATO and a green light to launch long-range strikes inside Russia. But Kyiv’s allies in Europe are tied up with political divisions and distractions, and they are waiting to see who ends up in the White House.
“We don’t know what a second Trump term would actually bring on Ukraine, although there is much fear,” said Adam Thomson, director of the European Leadership Network and a former British ambassador to NATO.
“European national politics are always messy, but there is a higher level of fear at the moment about far-right and far-left influence,” he added. “In some countries, publics are getting bored or, on the far right or far left, hostile to continuing support to Ukraine.”
Anticipating a possible US pivot on Ukraine
With the U.S. presidential election just over a week away, the biggest worry at NATO headquarters, by far, is the potential for a U.S. pivot.
European leaders are girding for the possible return of a president who has bashed the NATO alliance and threatened to turn his back on Washington’s closest military and diplomatic partners. While few policymakers expect that Trump would leave NATO, many fear a more transactional or erratic approach to the Western military alliance.
“He’s not that difficult to read, he craves respect,” said a NATO diplomat, who like others interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive deliberations. Still, “nobody has the slightest idea what Trump could do, so you have to be ready for all scenarios.”
What Trump might do about the war in Ukraine is among the open questions. He has said he wants to help Ukrainians, “because I feel badly for those people.” But in the same breath, he blamed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for starting the conflict and declared, “That war’s a loser.”
To establish greater certainty, European policymakers have started bringing control of key elements of military aid for Ukraine under NATO command, even as they recognize that U.S. dominance at NATO, and the mammoth U.S. share of funding for Ukraine, means there’s little they could do if a new U.S. president pulls the plug.
A European diplomat likened the new Ukraine command to moving the supply chain from U.S. hands to NATO hands. “Let’s say the U.S. provides a tank: There’s a whole logistical chain to get the tank to Ukraine,” he said. “In this new system, you’ll have German, Canadian, Romanian soldiers and so on, versus mostly U.S. personnel. But if donors take away the tank, there’s not much you can do.”
Nathalie Tocci, director of the Rome-based Institute for International Affairs and a former E.U. foreign policy adviser, said European governments have sought to boost defense spending and gradually carried more weight in funding Kyiv. But they would be in big trouble if the U.S. share “were to disappear abruptly.”
Even a President Kamala Harris would be something of a question mark. The Democratic nominee has declared her “unwavering” support for Ukraine, and European officials expect she would broadly continue the policies of the Biden administration. But to secure additional funding, she would need the support of Congress, and depending on the election results and mood of the country, that could become even more difficult than it has been.
French President Emmanuel Macron, speaking on a panel this month, said that whoever is elected, Europe will no longer be a U.S. priority.
“They are a super loyal and reliable partner on Ukraine. Will it last? I don’t know,” he said. “We are a strong ally of the U.S., no discussion. But we have to de-risk our model from the U.S. agenda.”
Responding to pressures within Europe
There’s no doubt that the war in Ukraine hits much closer to home here than across the Atlantic. In Eastern Europe particularly, where Ukraine and Russia’s neighbors are shaken by their own histories and fears of spillover, the sense of urgency has been acute.
But there are signs that public commitment may be flagging in parts of Europe.
While majorities in many Europeans countries still in favor weapons delivery to Ukraine, that support has weakened over time, according to multiple public opinion surveys.
Within Germany — Kyiv’s second-biggest military backer after the United States — the portion of people saying financial support for Ukraine is too high nearly doubled, from 21% in the early weeks of the war to 41% early this year, pollster Infratest Dimap found.
“It was perhaps not clearly communicated from the start that it’s not a short-term thing we’re doing,” said Thomas Obst, senior economist at the German Economic Institute. “It’s something long-term.”
Politicians from the far right and populist left have tapped into growing impatience about the war and tied it to frustrations about European economies. Pro-Russian populist Robert Fico won in Slovakia last year on a promise to end arms shipments to Ukraine. Parties with links to Moscow that called for cuts to military aid for Ukraine performed well in elections last month in three eastern German states, where ties to Russia run deeper than in the west.
Tocci said “paralysis in Berlin” and “fragility in France” present a bigger risk than public opinion and could prevent the “really strong decision-making on Ukraine that would be necessary in a Trump scenario.”
Macron has been in ensnared in political chaos since his movement suffered losses in European and national legislative elections.
And German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s ruling coalition, buffeted by far-right gains and beset by infighting, doesn’t seem poised to make many bold moves ahead of federal elections next year.
A draft of Germany’s 2025 budget included plans to cut aid to Ukraine in half, to 4 billion euros. German officials have suggested that Ukraine won’t need as much bilateral support, because it will be able to draw on the $50 billion in loans approved by the G-7.
“It’s difficult for every country,” said a senior NATO official. “If we spend billions next year on Ukraine, we can’t spend that on extra teachers, extra nurses.”
NATO diplomats note that Europe’s support for Ukraine is not merely altruistic. “We’re not do-gooders; it’s in our interest that [Russian President Vladimir] Putin doesn’t prevail,” the official said.
But he added, “The longer it lasts, the harder you have to work to maintain support, because the more there will be voices that say, ‘Why are we prolonging this conflict?’”
Kate Brady in Berlin contributed to this report.
