It is interesting to see how some things in modern warfare have not changed. Comparing an aspect of our Vietnam conflict with the war the Israelis are fighting today in Gaza bears this out.

In any war, intelligence is all-important in being able to predict what an opposing side is planning and then acting to counter it. The Oct. 7 Hamas raid into Israel, killing 1,200 Israeli civilians, demonstrated the consequences of such an intelligence failure.

In such conflicts, modern technology used by one side can give it an advantage over the other in collecting intelligence, unless said other can come up with some way to offset it. In this regard then, warfare turns into a bit of a chess match by which the enemy targeted by the technology endeavors somehow to negate it. This was done somewhat successfully by our North Vietnamese enemy in impacting upon our ability to try to monitor their communications; it appears Hamas is doing the same to the Israel Defense Forces in Gaza.

Wireless communications on the battlefield first evolved during World War I, laying the groundwork for communications strategies in World War II and beyond. As it evolved, so too did technologies for listening in on these wireless communications.

A technology to inhibit one side from understanding communications transmitted by the other was developed during World War II. The Germans created a code known as “Enigma,” involving 1.5 sextillion combinations that was deemed, at least by them, to be unbreakable. However, unbeknownst to Germany, that code was broken by the U.S.

Hence, during the Vietnam War, we attempted to eavesdrop on North Vietnamese communications along the infamous “Ho Chi Minh Trail” — a logistical supply line network of several roads and alternative routes by which our enemy was able to transit war materials and personnel. To our surprise, we were unable to pick up much communications traffic to learn when supply convoys might be running.

Only after the war’s end did we learn why. Fearing any cryptic wireless communications might be broken by the U.S., the North Vietnamese resorted to a rather simple way to offset our monitoring capabilities. They resorted to using an older technology — field phones that were connected between two points by a single wire — that could not be monitored by modern technology.

The old field phones had a downside, however. If a line were broken, fixers often had to travel for miles through difficult terrain to find and repair the break, which disrupted communications until they could be re-established.

The Gaza war has seen a continuation of this battlefield chess match.

Based on their relatively small population, the Israelis are among the world’s most innovative. They recently demonstrated this, if an alleged tactic used recently to assassinate senior Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh, who was a guest in Iran at the time, is correct. Haniyeh, feeling safe enough in Tehran to use his cellphone, enabled the Israelis to vector in on his exact location and take him out with a missile strike.

But even higher than Haniyeh on their list to locate and eliminate is Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar, 61. While an extensive tunnel system in Gaza has been located, with miles of it now destroyed, it is believed there are still many more miles of tunnels in operation to be located. It is also believed Sinwar avoids being located by using the remaining tunnel network. Meanwhile, he knows the best way to ensure his own survival is not to communicate electronically for fear of Israeli technology determining his location as it did with Haniyeh.

Sinwar has gone totally silent, being referred to as a “ghost.” He now only communicates in writing, with his messages given to trusted “carrier pigeon” fellow terrorists to transport. Obviously, it is a rather archaic means of communication in this day and age but one necessary for Sinwar’s personal safety. It may well explain why, since any peace agreement between Israel and Hamas must involve input from Sinwar, negotiations are being drawn out by this communication system.

Israel has recently made another move in its chess match with Hamas to locate Sinwar. While the exact capabilities of the technology have not been fully disclosed, Israel has obtained a unique high-penetrating ground radar to aid in the search for Sinwar. As the Hamas tunnels lie fairly deep underground, it is unknown how deep the radar can penetrate and whether there are any other “indicators” it homes in on.

Just like the U.S. did in its search for terrorist Osama bin Laden after 9/11 when he had gone into hiding, Israel has set up an intelligence unit to analyze information concerning Sinwar’s possible location. That unit recently reported that to get from one tunnel system to another, a clean-shaven Sinwar is known to don women’s clothing – an act condemned by Islam — and walk the streets of Gaza. He has learned from bin Laden’s ill-fated decision to remain at a single location, not to spend more than 24-36 hours in one place. Even doing so, there have been several times the Israelis reached a location abandoned by Sinwar only minutes earlier.

Additionally, hundreds of thousands of dollars have been offered as a reward for any information leading to Sinwar’s location as well as other senior Hamas leaders — more money than any Palestinian would see in several lifetimes due to their leaders’ corruption.

It is now known the planning for the Oct. 7 Hamas sneak attack on Israel began even before the 2014 Gaza conflict, among only five senior leaders who were its architects, updated after the 2021 conflict, with the final decision to execute the plan made only days prior. Of those five leaders, while two are now confirmed kills and one is a possible kill, only Sinwar and his brother definitely remain alive.

Sinwar has been the victim — and survivor — of at least six Israeli assassination attempts before the Oct. 7 massacre. He has long had the reputation of a cat with nine lives. It remains to be seen if the ghost has three lives left or, more appropriately, is a dead man walking.

James Zumwalt is a retired Marine infantry officer (lieutenant colonel) who served in the Vietnam War, Panama and Operation Desert Storm. He is the author of three books and hundreds of opinion pieces in online and print publications.