U.S. troops are withdrawing from Niger, ending a decade of U.S. operations against local affiliates of al-Qaida and Islamic State. Niger is now turning to Russia for help. In a brazen (and potentially dangerous) affront to the United States, the Nigerien government has elected to house newly arrived Russian troops on a base currently occupied by U.S. forces. U.S. defense officials are calling this “a devastating blow” to U.S. security in a region “at the tipping point of being captured by the Russian Federation.” This panicked reaction makes sense given the assumptions in U.S. policy circles that terrorist threats in West Africa are a major threat to the U.S. and that our so-called “loss” in Niger is Russia’s automatic gain.

The problem is these assumptions are wrong. Drawing down from Niger isn’t some kind of strategic disaster. Instead, it’s an overdue move that secures the safety of U.S. troops and should be the basis for reconsidering U.S. security commitments in Africa writ large. If history is any guide, the U.S. departure also won’t lead to the Russian “takeover of Central Africa” some predict, but turn into a major bust for Moscow instead.

Research shows there basically is no threat to U.S. security from African terrorist groups today. At their core, groups like Jama’at Nusra al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and ISIS-West Africa Province (ISWAP) that U.S. forces have been fighting from its bases in Niger aren’t global jihadis but are instead local insurgencies, targeting local governments. Along with just about every other terrorist group in Africa, they have never attempted to directly attack the United States or European nations. Affiliation by African terror groups to ISIS or al-Qaida is all about local objectives too — to raise their profile and money, not plan attacks against the West that they have no capability to carry out.

This means that the U.S. forces based in Africa (roughly 6,500 across 29 bases/outposts) are not countering threats to U.S. national security, but instead propping up various African regimes against these local insurgencies. U.S. troops are basically in the middle of someone else’s civil war — countering threats that present no great danger to the U.S., but greatly endanger U.S. forces.

Niger is a case in point. Violence has skyrocketed there since a military coup last July. In response, U.S. forces were mostly confined to a base at Agadez. Recently, the Nigerien junta cut off air-transport to the base, leaving U.S. forces short on supplies and medicine. It blocked replacement troops from getting in too. Anti-Americanism fanned by the regime also led to recent protests against the U.S. Since July, U.S. troops have focused solely on force protection, meaning their primary mission has been to simply stay alive. Now, U.S. forces are based precariously close to Russian troops — yet another insult from the Nigerien regime that puts U.S. troops at risk.

All that adds up to one simple conclusion: getting U.S. troops out of Niger is the right call by a long shot. Another Black Hawk Down incident was just around the corner.

Now, it’s time to leave other regional conflict zones too. Following the announcement that the U.S. will withdraw from Niger, the U.S. is now complying with a request from the government of Chad to withdraw the small contingent of forces it had there. Good move. In Somalia, a large contingent of African Union forces are withdrawing next year, which, as in Niger, will leave the approximately 450 U.S. military personnel highly exposed to potential attack from al-Shabab — another group “predominantly interested in the nationalist battle against the Somali government,” not global jihad. Time to draw down U.S. forces and switch to a political solution in Somalia.

Moving troops out of African conflict zones shouldn’t mean abandoning counterterrorism altogether in Africa. For a time, Washington probably should negotiate to keep a base in a stable country in each region marked by terrorism — West, East and North Africa — to monitor groups and conduct strikes against potential global-reach threats. Aside from that, little more is needed on the force front.

So, what about Russia? Aren’t its gains in Africa losses for the U.S.? Likely not. Russia gets more access to natural resources and minerals through its engagement in Africa — that’s a gain. However, it’s hard to see how those kinds of gains coupled with the small Russian troop deployments (e.g., only 100 in Niger) presage a “takeover,” as U.S. defense officials say. At some point, Russia will also find itself where the U.S. is today — namely, ostracized, with West African nations asking them to leave too.

Why? Because Russia brings nothing new to counterterrorism in Africa. It’s doubling down on the same force-first strategy used by the United States to this point, which has failed miserably. In West Africa, violent extremism has increased at a staggering rate since U.S. counterterrorism operations began. That trend has accelerated since Russian forces arrived. Despite the presence of Wagner forces in Mali, violence against civilians there increased by nearly 40% last year. If that is what building influence looks like, it doesn’t work, as the United States knows from its own experience. In short, this won’t end well for Russia.

The U.S. departure from Niger is painful for the U.S. military, but also an opportunity for change. Let’s hope U.S. policymakers can seize that opportunity and move to less force-based approaches better-suited for U.S. interests and good for Africans too.

C. William Walldorf Jr. is Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Wake Forest University and a Visiting Fellow at Defense Priorities. He is currently writing a book, “America’s Forever Wars: Why So Long, Why End Now, What Comes Next,” focused on Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.