Ukrainian artillerymen fire the M109 self-propelled howitzer during training at Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, in May 2022. Soldiers from the U.S. and Norway trained Ukrainian artillerymen amid Ukraine’s ongoing defense of its country against Russia’s invasion. (U.S. Army)
WASHINGTON — U.S. Army troops in Germany scaled down some training in favor of Ukrainian forces and faced challenges in keeping equipment functional, according to a federal watchdog report released Tuesday.
Some U.S. troops stationed in Grafenwoehr, Germany, reported they were negatively impacted by scheduling conflicts, additional equipment wear and tear, and delays in meeting their own training requirements while supporting the training of Ukrainian troops, according to a Government Accountability Office report.
In a few instances, U.S. training had to be canceled or moved to sites in other countries to accommodate Ukrainian forces. Officials told the GAO that most units completed training as planned, but some training equipment that is available at Grafenwoehr — for gathering data and measurements, for example — was not available. Host nation requirements also led one battalion to scale down its training.
Additionally, U.S. Army units initially faced challenges training Ukrainian forces because the Defense Department did not always implement a total approach for some defense materials and weapons delivered under the presidential drawdown authority, which allows equipment to be pulled from existing U.S. military stocks and sent to Ukraine on an emergency basis.
Between February 2022 and April 2024, the Defense Department trained Ukrainian military personnel — mainly at U.S. training ranges in Germany — using various security assistance processes.
“However, the expanded size, scope, and speed of equipment deliveries to Ukraine contributed to training challenges,” the report read.
The Army units were generally notified 18 days in advance about the training requirements for arriving equipment, which was not sufficient time to plan that training for Ukrainian forces. Typically, units need 30 to 60 days to plan and schedule such training, the GAO said. The federal watchdog was also told some equipment items — such as Paladin tanks — arrived late, in insufficient quantities, and in some cases, were not in working condition.
As a result, the training unit needed additional time and resources to repair the remaining Paladins to use them for training, according to officials.
“The U.S. Army trainers also told us they had to adapt the programs of instruction for the training by rearranging the order of training events until they had time to repair the equipment,” the report read.
The GAO recommended the Pentagon require combatant commands to identify resources necessary for training when proposing a security assistance package, including situations that require rapid execution.
“U.S. Army officials told GAO they overcame these challenges by adapting training schedules and obtaining contractor support, among other strategies. By issuing additional guidance to ensure that combatant commands identify training needs when proposing a security assistance package, [the Defense Department] would be better positioned to avoid challenges that might disrupt associated training. This is especially relevant for future situations that require the rapid execution of [a presidential drawdown authority],” the report read.
Officials from three U.S. Army units that served as trainers told the GAO that challenges ultimately did not significantly reduce readiness because they had sufficient personnel, maintenance resources, and technical expertise available for the training mission from U.S. Army Europe and Africa.
Unit officials also described some positive effects on general readiness that might not be captured in a unit’s readiness reporting, including morale and retention, repetition, and knowledge sharing.
While the Defense Department has processes meant to assess training for Ukrainian forces and develop lessons learned from U.S. efforts, the department has not clearly communicated how U.S. European Command and subordinate commands should document this data nor attribute that data in information systems as required.
“As a result, [the Defense Department’s] lessons learned may not be comprehensive or timely, leading to missed opportunities for improvement,” the report read.
The GAO recommended EUCOM provide clear guidance to subordinate organizations on documenting approaches for assessing training provided to Ukrainian forces.
The federal watchdog also recommended the EUCOM direct subordinate organizations to capture and share relevant observations from ongoing efforts to train Ukraine’s forces through the Joint Lessons Learned Information System in a timely manner.
